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LEGISLATIVE NOTE
LEGISLATION-THE DELAWARE COASTAL ZONE ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
"It is hereby determined that the coastal areas of Delaware
are the most critical areas for the future of the State. . . . It is,
therefore, the declared public policy of the State of Delaware to
control the location, extent and type of industrial development in
Delaware's coastal areas."' Thus begins the recently enacted
Coastal Zone Act of Delaware. ' The present note will discuss this
landmark contribution to ecological legislation and compare it
with statutes controlling coastal or wetlands areas in other juris-
dictions of the United States. In addition, the legal validity of
this law will be examined both with respect to possible conflicts
with the commerce clause and the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
II. THE DELAWARE COASTAL ZONE ACT
A. Purpose and General Provisions
It has become increasingly obvious that the balance of nature
is being seriously threatened throughout this country. As a result,
pressure is being applied to the various legislative bodies to enact
laws to protect the environment from further encroachment in
the name of "progress." Within the past few years several juris-
dictions have passed statutes which make some attempt to achieve
this laudable result.3 This has been particularly observed with
respect to the coastal areas of the nation, which have been recog-
nized as being especially vulnerable.4 In response to this need, the
General Assembly of Delaware has enacted what is, as of this
writing, the most comprehensive legislation concerning the regu-
lation of industrial development in a coastal area.
I. Coastal Zone Act, DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 7001 (1971).
2. The term "coastal zone" cannot be exactly described per se. Legally, Delaware
defines it as that portion of its land extending the length of its coast, with a width that
commences at its territorial limits in Delaware Bay, and roughly extends a few miles
inland. Id. § 7002 (a).
3. See Part III, infra.
4. See generally Ludwigson, Managing the Environment in the Coastal Zone, 1 BNA
ENViR. Rpm. MONOGRAmt No. 3 (1970).
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The Delaware Coastal Zone Act5 (CZA) was passed in order
for that state to "protect the natural environment of its bay and
coastal areas and safeguard their use primarily for recreation and
tourism."6 In order to achieve this result, the CZA expressly pro-
hibits the further introduction into the coastal zone of "heavy
industry," including but not limited to oil refineries, basic steel
manufacturing plants, cellulosic paper mills, and petrochemical
complexes.7 In addition, because they represent a potential danger
of pollution "and generate pressure for the construction of indus-
trial plants in the Coastal Zone," the construction of additional
off-shore bulk transfer facilities is also proscribed. 8 Specific uses
not included in the Act's heavy industry ban are garment factories,
automobile assembly plants, and jewelry and leather goods manu-
facturing establishments.9 These uses are not considered to be sig-
nificant sources of pollution. Sewage treatment and recycling
plants are also exempt from the ban.10 In order to balance environ-
mental protection with the need for future industrial growth, and
to obtain new state and local tax revenues, manufacturing uses
other than heavy industry will be allowed in the Coastal Zone by
permit.11 All nonmanufacturing uses are unaffected by the statute.
The CZA provides that requests for a new manufacturing use
or expansion of an existing nonconforming use in the Coastal Zone
shall be sent to the State Planner. Such applications must include
site plans, a description of the proposed use, proof of approval of
the activity by the proper county or local municipal zoning auth-
orities, and an "Environmental Impact Statement."12 This "State-
ment" must evaluate the "effect of the proposed use on the
immediate and surrounding environment and natural resources
such as water quality, fisheries, wildlife and the aesthetics of the
region."13 The State Planner must then hold a public hearing on
5. Coastal Zone Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7001-14 (1971) [hereinafter referred to
as the CZA or the Act].
6. Id. § 7001.
7. Id. §§ 7002 (e), 7003. Non-conforming uses of such activities already in existence
are not affected. Id. § 7004 (a).
8. Id. § 7001.
9. Id. § 7002 (e).
10. Id. § 7003.
11. Id.§7004(a).
12. Id. § 7005 (a).
13. Id. § 7002 (c).
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the proposed permit,'4 and if he finds that the request is for a type
of use allowable by permit under the CZA, he must consider the
particular request in light of certain specific factors. These
include: (1) the new use's impact on the environment, which
includes consideration of the "probable air and water pollution
likely to generated ... under normal operating conditions as well
as during mechanical malfunction," the killing of area plant
and animal life, drainage and flood control, and production of
obnoxious odors; (2) the economic effects, such as jobs and in-
come generated, and potential tax revenues created in regard to
the amount of land that will be needed for the activity; (3)
aesthetic effects on the scenic quality of the local area; (4) effects
on neighboring land uses, such as public means of access to
coastal waters, effects on recreational facilities and surrounding
agricultural and residential communities; and (5) effects on local
plans in terms of the development or conservation of the local
areas. 1
B. Appeals and Litigation
The CZA establishes a ten member State Coastal Zone Indus-
trial Control Board which is empowered to hear appeals from
"[a]ny person aggrieved by a final decision of the State Planner.
1. "6 After a public hearing, at which the petitioner may bring
his lawyer, the Board may modify or reverse the Planner's ruling.
Similarly, the State Planner or "any aggrieved person" can appeal
an adverse decision of the Board to the superior court of the
affected county.' Appeals to the court must "be based on the
record of proceedings before the Board, the only issue being
whether the Board abused its discretion ....
Interestingly, the CZA defines "person" as including indi-
viduals, groups, corporations, administrative agencies, or other
14. Id. § 7005 (a).
15. Id. § 7004(b).
16. Id. § 7007 (b) (emphasis added). [The Delaware Coastal Zone Industrial Control
Board will hereinafter be referred to as "the Board.']
17. Id. § 7008. The phrase "aggrieved person" is a term of art involving the subject
of standing to sue. The latter is in itself a complicated issue and is generally beyond the
scope of this paper. For a recent discussion of this topic by the Supreme Court agreeing
that an injury to aesthetic and conservational, as well as economic interests, may be
sufficient to confer standing, see Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
18. CZA § 7008.
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legal entities.10 This broad definition presumably does not imply
that anyone in this category, for example conservation groups, can
appeal to the court as a matter of right if they simply do not like a
decision of the State Planner granting a use permit.20 As stated
above, such appellants must still be "aggrieved." 21 Nevertheless, if
this requirement can be met, there are no additional legal obsta-
cles to obtaining judicial review. The superior court may, of
course, reverse or modify an order of the Board.2 If the court
rules that a denial of, or restrictions upon, a permit constitute a
taking without compensation in violation of due process of law, a
fee simple or lesser title in the land may be acquired by the state
through a negotiated sale or via eminent domain." However, if
this option is not exercised by the state within five years, the use
permit must be granted.2 4
In case of a violation of any provision of the CZA, the
Attorney General of Delaware may issue a cease and desist order.
However, this order can only last thirty days, unless the violator
is also enjoined by the court.2 Penalties for violation of the Act
19. Id. § 7002 (g).
20. Cf. Kerpelman v. Board of Pub. Works of Maryland, 261 Md. 436, 276 A.2d 56
(1971) (denying standing to a private individual).
21. CZA § 7008. Under this provision even an applicant who is denied a use permit
must still show aggrievement. Conceivably, he may even have to litigate this issue. Cf.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-7n (a) (Supp. 1971), allowing appeal by an applicant denied
a permit for a regulated activity in a wetlands area as of right. Nevertheless, the necessity
for such an applicant's aggrievement in order to sue is currently a major issue discussed
in Second Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Expunge Plea in Abatement,
Ryker Indus. Corp. v. Gill, Civil No. 170229, (Super. Ct., Hartford County, filed Oct. 28,
1971). In Ryker, conservation groups allege that plaintiff, who claims damages of
$78,000,000, is not aggrieved within the meaning of the statute because the land in ques-
tion is below mean high tide, and thus, in fact, held by the state in trust for the people.
The implications of tidal title and the relationship of subaqueous land ownership and
littoral rights means that in Connecticut only in those cases where the land is above high
water mark will an applicant denied a use permit clearly be aggrieved. Delaware, however,
grants title to the low water mark. See State ex rel. Buckson v. Pennsylvania R.R., --
Del. -, 267 A.2d 455 (1969).
22. CZA § 7008.
23. Id. § 7009. The CZA makes no distinction between the littoral rights of private
shoreline owners and state-owned coastal land. Of course, "takings" by the state of private
littoral rights of landowners must be compensated. See generally R. REIs, CONNECTIGUT
WATER LAW: JUDICIAL ALLOCATION OF WATER RESOURCES (1967).
24. CZA § 7009. This provision, allowing the state to delay five years before deciding
to grant the applicant his permit or to condemn the land, may be invalid. Cf. Miller v.
City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951), where an ordinance allowing private
property to be similarly "frozen" for three years was declared unconstitutional as a taking
without just compensation; accord, Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224
N.E.2d 700,278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966) (six months).
25. CZA § 7010.
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can be up to fifty thousand dollars per offense, with continuing
activities considered as a separate violation for each day. 6
III. COASTAL ZONE REGULATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The essential importance of the CZA is that it goes consider-
ably further towards regulating development in a shoreline area
than any other legislation to date. No other state has enacted any-
thing similar to Delaware's flat ban on heavy industry from its
coast. Several states, however, have passed "dredge and fill," or
wetlands statutes, which generally require a permit from a state
conservation or natural resources agency before such activities can
be commenced on a wetland.2 7 As an example, Maryland has stated
in the preamble to its wetlands legislation that it is the "public
policy of this State, taking into account varying ecological, eco-
nomic, developmental, recreational and aesthetic values, to pre-
serve the wetlands and to prevent the despoliation and destruction
thereof." 28 Thus, anyone desiring to dredge or fill state owned wet-
lands must first obtain a license from the Board of Public Works.
Before such a license may be issued, the Maryland Secretary of Na-
tural Resources must approve the project after consulting with ap-
propriate federal, state and local agencies. 9 If the Secretary ap-
proves the project, the Board must nevertheless hold hearings to
determine whether the activity is "in the best interests of the State"
before it may finally grant the license.30 Violators of this provision
may be fined one thousand dollars and become liable for the res-
toration of the area to its prior state.31 It is significant to note that
these provisions apply only to state wetlands; privately owned wet-
lands are only under such regulations concerning dredging and
filling as the Secretary of Natural Resources may issue, subject to
approval by the Agricultural Commission.32 Penalties for viola-
26. Id. § 7011.
27. The definition of the term "wetland" varies from state to state, but it generally
refers to a swamp, marsh, bog, etc. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-7i (2) (Supp.
1971).
28. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66c, § 718 (1970). The Maryland legislation is reviewed in
Comment, Maryland's Wetlands: The Legal Quagmire, 30 MD. L. REV. 240 (1970).
29. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 721 (1970). This wetlands statute is discussed in
State Bd. of Pub. Works v. Larmar Corp., 262 Md. 24, 277 A.2d 427 (1971).
30. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 721 (1970).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 722.
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tions on privately owned wetlands range up to one hundred dol-
lars and/or one month's imprisonment. These regulations are
thus dearly less restrictive than those of the CZA, which regulates
the entire coastal zone and allows substantial fines for violations.
A more effective wetlands statute is that of Connecticut,
in which it is stated that "much of the wetlands of the state have
been lost or despoiled by unregulated dredging, dumping, filling
and like activities and that the remaining wetlands of this state
are all in jeopardy of being lost or despoiled .... ,,34 Anyone en-
gaged in this type of activity on any wetland must apply for a per-
mit from the Commissioner of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The petitioner must furnish in his application a comprehensive des-
cription of his proposed use.35 The Commissioner must notify
various local and state authorities, hold a public hearing, consider
the effect of the activity on the public health and welfare, and
inquire into the effects on marine and wildlife. 0 Penalties for
a knowing violation of the statute include the cost of restoration of
the area and up to one thousand dollars a day in fines.37 It should
be observed that while such legislation merely purports to regu-
late dredging, filling, excavation, and the like in wetlands areas,
these prohibitions may, in fact, provide broader protection for
the environment than the CZA. In these wetlands, no commercial
development is feasible without prior dredge and fill or similar
work. Thus, requiring a permit to dredge and fill, in reality,
necessitates approval of any proposed development. The CZA, on
the other hand, only regulates or prohibits certain uses. Conse-
quently, the main shortcoming of a comprehensive wetlands statue,
vis-4.-vis the Delaware Act, is that such legislation is limited to
the regulation of wetlands rather than affecting the entire coast.
3. Id. § 780. For a knowing violation of such dredge and fill regulations the maxi-
mum monetary penalty is one hundred dollars plus the cost of restoration. Compare this
with Delaware's statutory maximum of fifty thousand dollars per day. CZA § 7011.
34. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-7h (Supp. 1971).
35. Id. § 22-1.
36. Id. § 22-7m provides that if, on appeal to the superior court, the commissioner's
denial of a use permit is found to be a taking without compensation, the commissioner
may elect to issue the permit or allow damages to applicant in an eminent domain pro.
ceeding. This is similar to the Delaware provisions (see text at supra notes 23-24), but
without their possibility of a five year delay.
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-71, m & o (Supp. 1971). Note the requirement of a
"knowing" violation. Presumably a merely negligent offender is safe. The CZA penalizes
violations per se-knowledge is unnecessary.
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Other jurisdictions regulating wetlands include Georgia,38
Maine, 9 Massachusetts, 40 Vermont,41 and Rhode Island. 4 The ex-
tent of the regulation varies considerably from state to state. In
Rhode Island, coastal wetlands may be designated as areas whose
ecology may not be tampered with. However, while violators of
such a regulation may be enjoined, no express penalties are pro-
vided. Further, any landowner who suffers damage because of
any wetlands use regulation may specifically apply to the state
for damages.4" The latter is a very disturbing provision, which could
be disastrous in a larger state in terms of meaningful control of
wetlands areas. If all such owners have to be compensated, the
cost of regulation will be prohibitive. Of course, such a policy
eliminates the possibility of an unconstitutional taking in viola-
tion of due process. Vermont has a vague, generalized wetlands
statute that provides for a maximum fine of one hundred dollars
and/or up to 30 days imprisonment per violation.44 Thus, the Del-
aware Act, with its absolute ban on certain industry in the entire
coastal zone, its detailed provisions, and its steep penalties, goes
well beyond any other state plan to date.
There is as yet no federal law dealing expressly with the con-
trol of activities in coastal areas for ecological purposes.40 The
Rivers and Harbors Act provides that "it shall not be lawful to
excavate or fill ...the channel of any navigable water of the
United States, unless the work has been recommended by the
Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army
38. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-136 to 45-147 (Supp. 1970), discussed in Note, Regulation
and Ownership of the Marshlands: The Georgia Marshlands Act, 5 GA. L. REv. 563 (1971).
39. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-09 (Supp. 1970).
40. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, §§ 22-27 (Supp. 1971).
41. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1100-05 (Supp. 1971).
42. R.I GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 2-1-13 to 2-1-17 (Supp. 1970). This list is by no means
exhaustive. For an excellent comparative analysis of New England wetlands legislation,
see R. BRENNEMAN, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COASTAL WETLANDS IN CONNECTICUT, REPORT TO
SAVE THE WETLANDS COMMITTEE, INC. (1968).
43. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 2-1-16 (Supp. 1970); cf. Krasnowiecki & Paul, The
Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 179-239 (1961).
44. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1100-05 (Supp. 1971). Vermont does not border the
Atlantic Ocean. Thus, this legislation deals only with inland wetlands.
45. It is generally agreed that the states must be primarily responsible for their
coastal areas. For a recent discussion of proposed federal action in this area, which will
most likely take the form of monetary aid and support to the states, see Knight, Proposed
Systems of Coastal Zones Management: An Interim Analysis, 3 NATURAL REsoURcEs LAw.
599 (1970).
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prior to beginning the same." 40 Whether or not this provision auth-
orizes the Secretary of the Army to withhold a permit on purely
ecological grounds where no obstruction to navigation would
occur is, at present, a matter of considerable controversy. In the
recent, possibly landmark case of Zabel v. Tabb,4 7 a United States
court of appeals held that "there is no doubt that the Secretary can
refuse on conservation grounds to grant a permit under the Rivers
and Harbors Act. ' ,8 The court's ruling there was based essentially
on national policy considerations aimed at preventing further in-
roads into the ecology of the local area.49 Authority for the Secre-
tary to deny the permit was founded on a House of Representa-
tives Report, 0 the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 1 the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969,.2 and ultimately, the
commerce clause.53 In reaching its decision, however, the court vir-
tually ignored a major issue that is often present in cases involving
the regulation of private land, namely, the question of a taking
without compensation in violation of due process of law. 4 Thus,
while Zabel may have been ecologically beneficial, other federal
courts have rejected its reasoning, and have held that a permit
could be validly denied only where navigation was in fact im-
peded.' 5 A Congressional amendment to the Rivers and Harbors
Act specifically authorizing the denial of a permit on conservation
grounds would, at least, obviate the need for courts to make "pub-
lic policy" decisions in such cases without substantial statutory or
46. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
47. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). This case has
been noted in several recent articles. See, e.g. 19 KAN. L. REV. 539 (1971) ; 16 VILL. L. REv.
766 (1971).
48. 430 F.2d at 214 (emphasis added); accord, Citizens Comm. for the Hudson
Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cerl.
denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1971); cf. Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 324
F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971).
49. Plaintiffs were thus denied a permit to dredge and fill in Florida's Boca Ciega
Bay, which they requested to construct a trailer court.
50. OUR WATERS AND WETLANDS: How THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS CAN HELr PREVENT
THmIR DEsTRuCTION AND POLLUTION, H.R. REP. No. 917, 91st. Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970).
51. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1970).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47 (1970).
53. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
54. 430 F.2d at 215. The taking issue is discussed in Part IV, infra.
55. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Secretary of Army, 315 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Fla. 1970);
Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969), rev'd, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.), cart.
denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). Interestingly, in Coastal Petroleum, the court found that it
.ould not validly allow a permit to mine Lake Okeechobee to be simply denied to
plaintiff. The district court faced the taking issue squarely, withheld the permit, but
ordered compensation.
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case law authority. Alternatively, sufficient authority could be pro-
vided by a favorable interpretation of this Act by the Supreme
Court.
IV. VALIDITY OF THE COASTAL ZONE ACT
The validity of zoning legislation has traditionally been
attacked as being violative of the due process clause of the United
States Constitution, 6 and there is no reason to expect the CZA to
escape being assaulted on this ground. In fact, this particular
statute may have to face an additional onslaught from a different
direction, namely, the commerce clause." The CZA prohibits con-
,struction of off-shore bulk transfer facilities for oil, which naturally
would be shipped from international sources."" Clearly, this would
involve some interference with foreign and interstate commerce.
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that this will prove to be a critical
problem. In dealing with the validity of local statutes regulating
interstate commerce in the absence of conflicting congressional
legislation, the Supreme Court has for some time employed a
balancing test of state versus national interest 9 In a recent arti-
culation of this policy the Court has proclaimed that:
[W]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is dearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.60
The local benefit resulting from the prevention of oil and other
pollution, in addition to beach preservation, seems fairly strong
here. The evenhandedness of the legislation is shown by its
application of the restrictions to all new industry, whether state
residents or not. Further, even if the courts should indeed find
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. Id. art. I, § 8, d. 3.
58. CZA § 7001. The desirability of Delaware Bay for bulk transfer oil facilities is
due to the fact that it is one of only two east coast naturally occurring deep water ports
capable of handling the giant supertankers now increasingly being built. The only other
such facility is in Maine.
59. This test was implied as early as Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Philadephia,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). The call for the employment of such an explicit balancing
test by the Supreme Court in regard to state regulations affecting interstate commerce
was urged in Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1 (1940).
The test was first fully stated in Southern Pac. R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
60. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (emphasis added).
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the burden on interstate commerce "excessive," in comparison
-to the benefits to Delaware, only a small portion of the Act would
be invalidated by such a ruling. The remainder of the statute is
expressly not to be affected, as provided in the Act's savings
clause.6'
The principal legal issue raised to date in cases dealing with
restrictions on uses of coastal wetlands has been the well-known
question of "taking" of private property without compensation
in violation of due process, as opposed to the reasonable regulation
of private property under the police power of the state. 2 This
difficult issue has troubled the courts since the nineteenth century,
and there is still no test for determining whether or not a particular
limitation requires compensation or not.63 As the Supreme Court
has stated, "[t]raditionally, we have treated the issue . . . as being
a question properly turning upon the particular circumstances
of each case." 64 "There is no set formula to determine where regu-
lation ends and taking begins. Although a comparison of values
before and after is relevant... it is by no means conclusive...."I"
The best way to observe how modern courts have dealt with
the present issue is to examine a few recent cases involving
regulation of coastal zone property. As we shall see, the results
61. CZA § 7014.
62. See generally Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Rxv. 1165 (1967); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YAa.n L. J. 36 (1964); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging
by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 So. CALIF. L. REV. 1
(1970).
63. Some of our greatest jurists have spoken on the subject of "taking" versus policc
Power. The elder Harlan said:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community,
cannot.., be deemed a taking ... of property for the public benefit .... The
power which the States have of prohibiting such use . . . is not-and . . . cannot
be-burdened with the condition that the State must compensate . . . owners for
pecuniary losses . . . by reason of their not being permitted ... to inflict injury
upon the community.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887). Mr. Justice Holmes said that: "[W]hile
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Mr. Justice
Brandeis in his dissenting opinion wrote: "Restriction upon use does not become in-
appropriate ... merely because it deprives the owner of the only use to which the
property can then be profitably put." Id. at 418.
64. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (emphasis
added).
65. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (emphasis added).
See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), upholding a reduction in value from
S800,000 to $60,000.
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are not unequivocal. Perhaps the best known case in this area
is Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe, Inc.6  There,.
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a statute67 re--
quiring a permit from state and local officials before dredge and
fill activities could be undertaken in wetlands areas. The court
held that whether or not there was a taking of the defendant's
property essentially depended on the value of the property to the
defendant as a marsh compared to its value filled. This decision
seems to imply that if a regulated marsh has no commercial value
to its owner, he is free to fill it in and destroy it unless the state is
willing to compensate him. The same Massachusetts court again
upheld private property rights in MacGibbon v. Board of
Appeals.05 There, a local municipality's denial of a permit to exca-
vate and fill shoreland was reversed. The court found that in order
to preserve the area in its natural state, defendant was apparently
not going to allow any improvements along the town shoreline. 9
Since such a regulatory conservation measure would be primarily
one of public benefit, the Board had no authority to impose an
individual burden on landowners by preventing them from
obtaining any practical use out of their land, unless compensa-
tion were provided. In fact, the court expressly suggested that
eminent domain would be appropriate here.70
A completely unequivocal decision in favor of property rights
is found in State v. Johnson.7 1 There, a dredge and fill permit was
denied to applicants under authority of the Maine Wetlands Act.72
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed. Finding that the issue was
between "stopping the insidious despoliation of our natural
66. 849 Mass. 204, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965). Plaintiffs sued to enjoin defendant from
further filling a saltmarsh as part of a marina and housing project, and to compel re-
moval of all landfill already completed. Defendant alleged that without the fill its prop-
erty would virtually be of no use at all. The trial court had granted the injunction.
67. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 130, § 27A (Supp. 1971).
68. 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970). Plaintiffs applied for a permit to excavate
and fill a portion of their shoreland. The Duxbury Board of Appeals denied the permit,
and the trial court affirmed, holding that defendant did not exceed its authority.
69. Id. at 640, 255 N.E.2d at 351.
70. Id. at 641, 255 N.E.2d at 352. In addition to the property owners having no
practical use for their land, they would, of course, still have its tax burden to pay.
71. - Me. -, 265 A.2d 711 (1970).
72. ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-09 (Supp. 1970). Here the trial court found
plaintiffs' land would be valuable for housing if filled, but essentially worthlesss as a
marsh. Nevertheless, it affirmed denial of the fill permit by the Wetlands Control Board
of Maine.
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resources,"73 and the protection of private property rights, the
court held that under the circumstances of the case, the regulation
would be a taking. To leave these plaintiffs with worthless land
would be "to charge them with more than their just share of the
cost of [the] statewide conservation program, granting fully its
commendable purpose."7 4 The result here seems anomolous. The
court balanced the public and private interests, found a very
strong public interest, but still held for the property owner.
A considerably better result, at least in terms of ecological
interests, is seen in Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Development Commission.7 i There, a denial
of a permit to fill submerged land was upheld under a California
statute designed to protect the Bay Area,76 despite the fact that the
property was apparently worthless for anything else. According to
the court, the police power is inherent in the sovereign power
of the state and cannot be restricted unless clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable. It does not depend upon judicial precedent, nor is
it based upon conditions of the past, "'which do not cover and
control present day conditions ... calling for revised regulations
to promote the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the
public .... ' "1 Thus, under the circumstances of this case,
it cannot be said that refusing to allow appellant to fill its bay
land amounts to an undue restriction on its use. In view of the
necessity for controlling the filling of the bay, as expressed by
the Legislature .... it is clear that the restriction imposed does
not go beyond proper regulation . . .7
73. - Me. at -, 265 A.2d at 716 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at -, 265 A.2d 716 (emphasis added); accord, Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n
of Old Lyme, 2 BNA ENVmR. RPTR. DECISIONS 1684 (1971); cf. Dooley v. Town Plan &
Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964); Morris County Land Improvement
Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A,2d 232 (1963).
75. 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970). Plaintiff purchased
submerged land in San Francisco Bay for forty thousand dollars specifically to deposit
fill from a construction project. This parcel was adjacent to other filled or partially filled
parcels.
76. McAlteer-Petris Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66600 et seq. (West 1971). Under § 66604,
the Bay Conservation and Development Commission has the power "to issue or deny
permits, after public hearings, for any proposed project that involves placing fill in the
Bay .... "
77. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 570-71, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
78. Id. at 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 906; cf. Golden v. Board of Selcctmcnt of Falmouth,
- Mass. -, 265 N.E.2d 573 (1970), where the court upheld a denial of a permit to
excavate a tidal marsh by local zoning authorities, despite its approval by appropriate
state officials. In Golden, however, the taking without compensation issue was not dis.
cussed.
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Thus the court found no taking. In Candlestick, the public and
private interests were balanced, the public interests were found to
be very substantial, and the regulation was sustained.79
It is quite apparent that the attitude of the Supreme Court of
Delaware toward the taking issue will ultimately dictate the
effectiveness of the Coastal Zone Act. That court might well tend
to find applications of the CZA as takings requiring compensation
to property owners, as did, for example, the Maine court in John-
son. If this in fact occurs, and Delaware is either forced to spend
large amounts of money to condemn land by eminent domain, or
allow polluting activities, then the Act could be rendered ineffec-
tive. Alternatively, if the court adopts the positive approach of
the California court in Candlestick, then the CZA should go far
towards preserving the Delaware Coastal Zone. Of course, actual
effectiveness must, to a large extent, depend on the manner in
which the Act is applied by state administrators. If the Act is not
vigorously enforced we may see litigation primarily between per-
mit applicants and conservation groups. s0
There remains one final hurdle to be dealt with. Some of the
cases discussed above have specifically involved constitutional issues.
In none of them, however, even where a due process violation
was found under the given circumstances, was a state coastal
zone regulatory statute invalidated. Nevertheless, as we have seen,
the CZA goes well beyond the other statutes. The most radical
innovation of the Act is the absolute ban on "heavy industry" in
the coastal zone. This was done because such industry, "although
conceivably operable without polluting the environment, has the
potential to pollute when equipment malfunctions or human error
occurs."81 Assuming a permit applicant who could show that in fact
his heavy industry would not pollute beyond a de minimis level,
this provision seems to be a vulnerable part of the CZA. The
hypothetical plaintiff could argue that the statute is arbitrary and
unreasonable-it violates the equal protection clause, since it dis-
criminates against him as compared with other non-polluters, and
it violates due process of law, since he is being penalized as a
79. It should be pointed out that the filling of San Francisco Bay represents a par-
ticularly pressing threat, and thus the public interest in regulation here may be unusually
strong. See Note, Saving San Francisco Bay: A Case Study in Environmental Legislation,
23 STA. L. Rzv. 349 (1971).
80. But see, supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
81. CZA§7002(e).
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polluter when he is, in fact, not. Under such a fact situation, it
is conceivable that a hostile court could invalidate the heavy in-
dustry proscription, and even the entire Act.12 Of course, this is
an unlikely result in general, and in the present era, very improb-
able. Given the above circumstances, a court is most likely to find
the statute unreasonable only as to the applicant and order a per-
mit issued to him. The basic statute itself should not be found
unconstitutional, since it surely cannot be said that its provi-
sions are "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substan-
tial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare.""
V. CONCLUSION
The CZA is a landmark piece of legislation designed to pro-
tect the Delaware coast and beaches from future development in
the interests of conservation. While it goes considerably further
than previous legislation, the Act itself seems basically valid,
although certain provisions of it could eventually be struck down.
The ultimate effectiveness of the OZA probably will depend on
whether or not the state courts tend to find regulation of private
property under the statute "takings" requiring compensation, or
merely valid exercises of the police power of the state.84 The Act
may well have been, at least in part, inspired by a holding of Del-
aware's Supreme Court denying regulation of a riparian owner's
landfill on the ground that the existing law did not give the state
sufficient authority to require its prior assent to such fill. The
court there stated: "If the [legislature] wishes to control such de-
velopment in the future by requiring prior permission, it must do
so by legislation duly enacted . ... ", The court's advice was
certainly followed. As for the future, it is hoped that
82. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312-16 (1936), where the labor pro-
-visions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, § 15, 49 Stat. 991, 1007,
-were declared unconstitutional and used to invalidate the entire Act. This was done in
spite of an express provision that if part of the legislation were declared void, the rest
was not to be affected.
83. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (emphasis added)
(promulgating the standard for invalidation of a zoning act).
84. As seen in Part IV supra, the majority of state cases that have been litigated on
this issue at the appellate level have found the respective regulations to be unconstitutional
takings under the given circumstances. Nevertheless, growing awareness of the necessity for
such regulations could ultimately change judicial attitudes as to the extent of the police
power.
85. State ex rel. Buckson v. Pennsylvania R.R., - Del. -, 267 A.2d 455, 460 (1969).
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[t]he courts will, from now on, recognize that a legislative de-
termination that [an] activity . . . needs to be regulated or
prohibited is entitled to the greatest deference, and ought to
be set aside only upon a clear showing that the activity . . .
cannot be... detrimental to the ecology.8 6
The CZA is courageous legislation in a small state that is
subject to the considerable influence of large chemical interests.
As stated by Governor Peterson, passage of the Act
could not have been achieved without enthusiastic public support
in the face of experienced lobbyists and concerted opposition
from some quarters. I trust that our action can indeed serve as a
forerunner for other states in ... a continuous effort to maintain
and protect our valuable resources.8 7
WILLIAM M. FEIGENBAUM
86. Garton, Ecology and the Police Power, 16 S.D.L. REV. 261,289 (1971).
87. Letter from the Hon. R. W. Peterson, Governor of Delaware, to the author,
September 7, 1971.

